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INTRODUCTION

T
T
O
W
I

The 1949 Geneva Conventions are remarkable achievements of
international law. They reflect hard-won, finely tuned, and time-tested
common ground between the broadest possible array of States. The
Conventions united States—wealthy and poor, developed and developing,
democratic and authoritarian, theocratic and secular, peaceful and bellicose.
Although voluminous, these treaties have generated relatively few
reservations or caveats from States Parties despite taking on the deeply
fraught subject of how to regulate war.
It is hardly surprising then that projects to update or reimagine the law
of war would seize upon the Geneva Conventions as a mechanism for doing
so. They offer auspicious potential for reform, for few international legal
instruments promise the extensive reach and legitimacy that the Conventions
do.1 To channel reform through them is to bind every State in the
international system and to leverage a legal tradition backed by over 150
years of iterative and largely proven regulation of war. Additionally, by virtue
of the Conventions’ incorporation into domestic implementing legislation
and the constitutive documents of major international criminal tribunals,
reforms fed through the Conventions enjoy compounded impact in national
and international judicial proceedings.2
Rather than through adoption of an additional protocol to the
instruments, as has occurred three times since 1949, such efforts to reform
regulation of the conduct of hostilities can manifest as a reinterpretation of
the existing text of the Geneva Conventions.3 Reform in the guise of
1. While customary international law also binds all States, it is rarely supported by the
clear and overt indicia of State consent and consensus that is evidenced by 194 ratifications
and accessions made to the Conventions.
2. The ICRC maintains a survey of national legislation implementing the Geneva
Conventions and their Protocols. See National Implementation of IHL: Documentation, ICRC,
https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/ihl-domestic-law/documentation.
The
Conventions also feature in the subject matter jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals
such as the International Criminal Court. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court art. 8(a), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed
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interpretation—at least as conceived in some circles—avoids the arduous
diplomatic and procedural trappings of treaty formation or amendment.
“Amendment by interpretation” can be accomplished by comparatively
efficient means. Securing consensus among prominent academics,
endorsement by an active private organization, or adoption by a panel of
experts or jurists can—again as conceived in some circles—stand in the place
of a full diplomatic conference. Just such an effort to reinterpret Common
Article 1 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions is underway. That effort is
gaining acceptance in influential, if not authoritative, spheres of the law of
war.
Common Article 1 rests atop each of those instruments in identical text
and is mirrored in a nearly indistinguishable form in Protocols I and III to
the Conventions.4 It simply states, “The High Contracting Parties undertake
to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all
circumstances.”5 The article performs double duty, both opening each of the
1949 Conventions, which lack substantial preambles, and imposing the
Conventions’ first obligation of conduct on States.
A plain reading of Common Article 1 does not provoke particularly
noteworthy comment. Indeed, a pillar of the law of war community, the late
Frits Kalshoven, observed over two decades ago that the article “may look
like a perfect example of a truism.”6 It largely expresses a corollary to the
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Adoption of
an Additional Distinctive Emblem, Dec. 8, 2005, 2404 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Additional
Protocol III].
4. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art 1(1);
Additional Protocol III, supra note 3, art. 1.
5. Article 1(1) of both Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol III, supra note 3,
substitute “this Protocol” for “this Convention” in the 1949 Conventions.
6. Frits Kalshoven, The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: From
Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit, 2 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3, 7
(1999).

676

Common Article 1 and the Duty to “Ensure Respect”

Vol. 96

general international legal obligation of States to honor their treaty
commitments as binding, expressed classically in the maxim pacta sunt
servanda.7
Yet, Common Article 1 has garnered increasing attention from
academics and private organizations as a vessel for a reimagination of States’
enforcement obligations under the Geneva Conventions. Inspired by a
judgment of the International Court of Justice,8 as well as by an advisory
opinion by that tribunal,9 academic writers and private organizations have
iteratively reinterpreted the article well beyond its original and established
meaning. They chiefly claim that subsequent practice has modified the
obligation to “ensure respect” for the Conventions to apply beyond a State’s
own organs and groups it controls during an international armed conflict.10
For them, the article includes a novel and additional “external” obligation—
a duty on the part of all States to use all available means to ensure respect
for all provisions of the Conventions by all other States during all armed
conflicts, even those to which the State in question is not a party.11 Adding
weight to the claim, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
has adopted this view in three successive volumes of its influential updated
commentaries on the 1949 Geneva Conventions.12
7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
8. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Paramilitary Activities].
9. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall].
10. See e.g., Robin Geiss, The Obligation to Respect and Ensure Respect for the Conventions, in
THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 109 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta
& Marco Sassoli eds., 2016); Oona A. Hathaway et al., Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article
1 and State Responsibility for Non-State Actors, 96 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 539, 569–77 (2017).
11. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, Common Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions Revisited: Protecting Collective Interests, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS 67 (2000).
12. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO GENEVA
CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR ¶¶ 153–222
(forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter ICRC, 2021 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA
CONVENTION III]; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO
GENEVA CONVENTION II FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE
WOUNDED, SICK, AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA ¶¶ 147–48,
175–79, 186–95 (2017) [hereinafter ICRC, 2017 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA
CONVENTION II]; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO
GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE
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Despite its putatively humanitarian motivation, this reworking of
Common Article 1 warrants caution. The law of war is meant to reflect not
only what is desirable in terms of humanity. It is also always sensitive to
preservation of States’ military interests during armed conflict, as well as the
realities of sovereignty in the international system.13 Significant
reinterpretation of the carefully struck, and often hard-won, bargains struck
by States at treaty conferences, especially when the resulting instruments
enjoy universal adoption, calls for comparably compelling supporting
evidence.
Although the 2016 and 2017 updated commentaries to, respectively,
Geneva Conventions I and II Geneva Convention 1 took a categorical
approach to the assertion that Common Article 1 includes an external
obligation, the recently released 2020 updated commentary to Geneva
Convention III has correctly conceded that “[t]here is disagreement as to the
legal nature of the positive component of the duty to ensure respect by
others because the content of the obligation is not clearly defined and its
concretization to a large extent left to the High Contracting Parties.” 14 In
light of that acknowledgment, this article takes a fresh look at the meaning
of Common Article 1.15
WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶¶ 125–26, 153–79 (2016)
[hereinafter ICRC, 2016 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I].
13. See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 795
(2010).
14. ICRC, UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III, supra note 12, ¶
202.
15. For discussions of Common Article 1, see, inter alia, Verity Robson, The Common
Approach to Article 1: The Scope of Each State’s Obligation to Ensure Respect for the Geneva
Conventions, 25 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 101 (2020)[hereinafter Robson];
Hathaway et al., supra note 10; Geiss, supra note 10; Knut Dörmann & Jose Serralvo, Common
Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the Obligation to Prevent International Humanitarian Law
Violations, 96 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 707 (2014); Robert Kolb,
Commentaires Iconoclastes sur L’obligation de Faire Respecter le Droit International Humanitaire Selon
L’article 1 Commun des Conventions de Genève de 1949, 46 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 513 (2013); Carlo Focarelli, Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
A Soap Bubble?, 21 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (2010); Tomasz
Zych, The Scope of the Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for International Humanitarian Law,
27 WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 251 (2009); Maya Brehm, The Arms Trade
and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, 6 JOURNAL OF
CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 359 (2008); Alexandre Devillard, L’obligation de Faire Respecter
le Droit International Humanitaire : L’article 1 Commun aux Conventions de Genève et à Leur Premier
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We reject claims that the various obligations to ensure respect ever
encompassed an external obligation or that their meaning has changed since
the adoption of the relevant treaties. State practice engaged in out of a sense
of legal obligation that is necessary to support the reimagined obligations is
quite simply lacking. Indeed, sufficient “negative State practice” exists to
preclude any possibility that Common Article 1 obligations extend to
ensuring respect by other States or that it applies outside the context of an
international armed conflict
In our view, the Common Article 1 obligation to “ensure respect” refers
to the legal duty of States that are party to an international armed conflict,
and Party to the instruments, to take those measures that are required to
ensure their nationals and others under their control comply with the 1949
Geneva Conventions and Protocols I and III. During those conflicts, they
impose no obligations on States that are not party to an armed conflict, apart
from those few obligations that expressly bind States during peacetime.
Instead, obligations set forth in those instruments are shouldered chiefly by,
and owed to, belligerent States—not to individuals and only rarely to nonbelligerent States —as a matter of law. For the time being, we call for fidelity
to the established meaning of “ensure respect.”

Protocole Additionnel, Fondement d’un Droit International Humanitaire de Coopération?, 20 REVUE
QUÉBÉCOISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 75 (2007); Marco Sassòli, State Responsibility for
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 84 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS
401 (2002); Birgit Kessler, The Duty to “Ensure Respect” under Common Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions: Its Implications on International and Non-International Armed Conflicts 44 GERMAN
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 498 (2001); Kalshoven, supra note 6, at 8; Azzam,
Fateh, The Duty of Third States to Implement and Enforce International Humanitarian Law, 66
NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1997); Hans-Peter Gasser, Ensuring Respect
for the Geneva Conventions and Protocols: The Role of Third States and the United Nations, in 2 ARMED
CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW: EFFECTING COMPLIANCE 15 (Hazel Fox & Michael Meyer
eds., 1993); Paolo Benvenuti, Ensuring Observance of International Humanitarian Law: Function,
Extent and Limits of the Obligations of Third States to Ensure Respect of IHL, YEARBOOK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 27 (1989–90); Luigi Condorelli &
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Quelques Remarques a` Propos de L’obligation des Etats de
“Respecter et Faire Respecter” le Droit International Humanitaire “en Toutes Circonstances, in ETUDES
ET ESSAIS SUR LE DROIT HUMANITAIRE ET SUR LES PRINCIPES DE LA CROIX-ROUGE EN
L’HONNEUR DE JEAN PICTET 17 (Chistophe Swinarski ed., 1984).
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THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF COMMON ARTICLE 1 AND ITS PROGENY

As indicated above, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and to a great extent
their Protocols, are remarkable accomplishments of legal consensus.
Although universally ratified (or acceded to), the Conventions are not
uniformly understood; varying interpretations of certain key provisions have
been proffered by States, jurists, academics, and international and private
organizations. Indeed, properly discerning their actual meaning often
involves the delicate and challenging task of treaty interpretation. The first
step in that process is to ascertain the original meaning of the provision in
question. Only once that task is accomplished satisfactorily can any
contemporary interpretation be confirmed as authoritative.
A. Development and Negotiation of Common Article 1
The obligation to “respect” the terms of a law of war treaty first appeared in
Article 82 of the 1929 Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of
War and Article 25(1) of the 1929 Geneva Convention on the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field.16 Those
provisions provided that the 1929 Geneva Conventions “shall be respected
by the High Contracting Parties in all circumstances.” The “in all
circumstances” clause largely confirmed the notion of “non-reciprocity.” In
other words, the instruments continued to bind belligerents that were Party
to them even when an adversary had violated their terms. It further
emphasized that the Conventions’ obligations applied regardless of the
Parties’ legal justification, or lack thereof, for resorting to war.
States later reproduced the 1929 Conventions’ references to “respect”
and “in all circumstances” in Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Article 1(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and 2005
Additional Protocol III. There is no apparent disagreement as to the
meaning of the term “respect;” the obligation requires States to honor the
provisions of the respective instruments. Even without this provision, the
actions of a State’s armed forces or other organs, as well as the activities of
armed groups under the State’s “effective control” pursuant to the law of
16. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929,
47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 118 L.N.T.S.
303.
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State responsibility,17 would qualify as internationally wrongful acts of the
State should they contravene its duties under the treaties.18 The respect
provision simply serves to make this point within the four corners of the
treaties.
The fact that the 1949 Geneva Conventions’ and their Protocols’
incorporated the term “in all circumstances” in an unamended manner
requires the phrase’s original meaning to be borne in mind. There is no
indication that the drafters of, or the States Parties that adopted, those
instruments intended a different meaning. Nor does practice evince any
subsequent agreement among the States Parties to embrace a changed or
expanded meaning of the term. Accordingly, the phrase can only be
interpreted as having the meaning originally attributed to it in the 1929
Conventions. It simply denotes an obligation on the part of Parties to an
armed conflict to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions even in
situations in which the enemy does not do so and regardless of casus belli. It
in no way operates to extend the obligations found in Common Article 1
and its progeny beyond international armed conflict or to States that are not
party to the conflict.
Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 1(1) of
Additional Protocols I and III deviate, however, from the 1929 texts through
the addition of an obligation to “ensure respect.” As is apparent from the
negotiating history, the addition of the term was designed to broaden the
“respect” obligation to the population as a whole. In other words, States
Parties now shouldered an obligation to take measures necessary to ensure
those under their control also complied, as appropriate, with the
instruments.19 There is no indication that the phrase was meant to have
“external effect” in the sense of imposing on Parties an obligation to take
17. G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, art. 8, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility]. Although Article 8 refers
to direction or control, the commentary thereto encompasses them in the widely accepted
notion of “effective control.” Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
53 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2
Yearbook
of
the
International
Law
Commission
48,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).
18. Internationally wrongful acts require (1) breach of a legal obligation, whether based
in treaty or customary international law, that is (2) attributable to a State pursuant to the law
of State responsibility. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 17, art. 2.
19. 2B FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 53
(1951).
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positive steps to ensure respect by belligerent States even when the former
do not exercise effective control over belligerents and are not party to the
armed conflict themselves. On the contrary, States like France, Norway, and
the United States objected to a broad understanding of the obligation.20
Indeed, as Professor Sir Adam Roberts noted in 1995, there “appears to
be little or nothing in the records of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference to
suggest an awareness on the part of government delegates, or indeed ICRC
participants, that the phrase ‘to ensure respect’ implied anything beyond
internal observance.”21 This view is shared by the late Professor Frits
Kalshoven in what is the most in-depth inquiry into the subject to date.22
After an exhaustive study of the matter, Professor Kalshoven concluded:
The point remains that the primary legal obligation arising from common
Article 1 is for States Parties to impose respect for the applicable rules of
international humanitarian law, ‘in all circumstances’, on their armed
forces, including armed groups under their control, and on their
populations: for the implementation of this obligation they can be held
legally responsible. No such legal liability attaches to their moral duty to
endeavour to ensure respect by their peers. Since it is their right to do this
under the law of treaties, they cannot be reproached for doing so either.23

The original commentaries to the 1949 Geneva Conventions prepared
under the general editorship of Jean Pictet and published in the authors’
private capacities between 1952 and 1960 are likewise supportive of this
position.24 Appearing soon after the Conventions entered force, the so-called
20. See the compelling discussion of how the matter was addressed at the conference
in Robson, supra note 15, at 112–13.
21. Adam Roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts, 6
DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 30 (1995).
22. Kalshoven, supra note 6, at 11–38.
23. Id. at 60.
24. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO II GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE WOUNDED AND SICK AT SEA (Jean Pictet ed., 1960)
[hereinafter 1960 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION II]; INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE
TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR (Jean Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter 1960
COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION III]; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE
RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION
OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR (Jean Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter 1958
COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION IV]; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
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“Pictet Commentaries” are not official, authoritative, or binding
documents.25 They amount to a commendable effort to explain the treaties
based on the participation of the authors in the diplomatic negotiations.
Addressing the inclusion of the “ensure respect” provision, the
commentary the Geneva Convention I provided:
The use of the words “and to ensure respect” was, however, deliberate:
they were intended to emphasize and strengthen the responsibility of the
Contracting Parties. It would not, for example, be enough for a State to
give orders or directives to a few civilian or military authorities, leaving it
to them to arrange as they pleased for the details of their execution. It is
for the State to supervise their execution. Furthermore, if it is to keep its
solemn engagements, the State must of necessity prepare in advance, that
is to say in peacetime, the legal, material or other means of loyal
enforcement of the Convention as and when the occasion arises.26

Thus, the authors understood “ensure respect” to be an internal duty
shouldered by parties to an armed conflict to take action to supervise
compliance with the Conventions by individuals they controlled, including
by virtue of territorial control.27 There is no disagreement that this was at
least the intention of the States that adopted the four Conventions at the
Diplomatic Conference in 1949.

CROSS, COMMENTARY TO II GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE WOUNDED AND
SICK (Jean Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter 1952 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION I].
25. The foreword to each of the four original commentaries includes the following
passage:
Although published by the International Committee, the Commentary is the personal work
of its authors. The Committee, moreover, whenever called upon for an opinion on a
provision of an international Convention, always takes care to emphasize that only the
participant States are qualified, through consultation between themselves, to give an official
and, as it were, authentic interpretation of an intergovernmental treaty .

1960 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 24, at 1; 1960 COMMENTARY
ON GENEVA CONVENTION III, supra note 24, at 1; 1958 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA
CONVENTION IV, supra note 24, at 1; 1952 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION I,
supra note 24, at 1.
26. 1952 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 24, at 26.
27. For instance, the International Court of Justice has acknowledged an obligation to
ensure respect on the part of a party in occupation of territory. Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶
211 (Dec. 19).
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Yet, Pictet and his colleagues did not understand the term to create any
binding external obligation for States that were not party to the conflict. If
they had, they would have continued to express themselves in obligatory
terms. They did not. On the contrary, when addressing the external factor in
the context of the ensure respect obligation, they characterized “ensure
respect” in hortatory terms. For instance, the same commentary observed,
“in the event of a Power failing to fulfill its obligations, the other Contracting
Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) may, and should, endeavor to bring it back to
an attitude of respect for the Convention.”28 The other three commentaries
contain similar language.29
What the Pictet Commentaries clarified with respect to the original
meaning of Common Article 1 was that attempts by States that are
uninvolved in an armed conflict (neutral States) to bring belligerent States
into compliance with the Conventions would not constitute prohibited
intervention into the latter’s internal or foreign affairs.30 They cannot be read
in context to suggest the existence of any legal duty on the part of States that
are not party to an international armed conflict to seek compliance by
belligerent States, even in circumstances in which such efforts would likely
be successful.
B. Common Article 1 in Context
To fully assess the meaning and scope of a treaty provision, it is also
necessary to apply “secondary” rules of international law governing their
interpretation. The generally accepted rules of interpretation are set forth in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, even for States that are not
Party to that instrument, such as the United States.31 According to Article
31(1) of that instrument, “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in

28. 1952 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 24, at 26 (emphasis
added).
29. 1960 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 24, at 25–26; 1960
COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION III, supra note 24, at 18; 1958 COMMENTARY ON
GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 24, at 16 (emphasis added).
30. On the prohibition of such intervention, see Paramilitary Activities, supra note 8, ¶¶
202–5.
31. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, https://20092017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm#:~:text=Is%20the%20United%20States%20a,
and%20consent%20to%20the%20treaty.
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accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”32
As to the ordinary meaning of “ensure respect,” it is appropriate to look
to other rules of international law when interpreting a provision.33 Imbuing
the term with an “external component” would be unusual from an
international law perspective. States are seldom responsible for ensuring other
States’ compliance with international law, and almost never to such an extent
that failure to take feasible measures to preclude another State’s
internationally wrongful act would itself be a violation. Rather, they must act
to ensure their own compliance by controlling the activities of State organs
and others for whom the State is legally responsible. One possible exception
is the so-called “due diligence” duty to put an end to ongoing hostile
activities by other States from the one’s territory if they seriously affect a
third State’s international law right. However, that somewhat unsettled
obligation derives from the right to sovereignty over territory and therefore
cannot be analogized to the purported ensure respect external obligation,
which implicitly rejects limitation based on territorial control.34
To discern treaty context, particular note must be taken of the structure
and text of the instrument in question.35 In this regard, most of the
obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions are imposed only on States
that are party to the conflict, and the instruments are, with the notable
exception of Common Article 3 and limited peacetime obligations,36 largely

32. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 31(1).
33. Id. art. 31(3)(c).
34. See discussion in TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 550–51 (Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed., 2017). A State
may, however, be responsible for internationally wrongful acts of another State if it directs
and controls the commission of the latter’s internationally wrongful act. It may also be
responsible for its own aid and assistance in another State’s unlawful conduct. See Articles
on State Responsibility, supra note 17, arts. 16–17.
35. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 31(2).
36. These include disseminating the Conventions and training one’s own armed forces.
Geneva Convention I, supra note 4, art. 47; Geneva Convention II, supra note 4, art. 48;
Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 127; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 4, art. 144.
They also include enacting legislation to provide penal sanctions for violations of the
Conventions and for preventing and repressing misuse of the distinctive protective
emblems. Geneva Convention I, supra note 4, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 4,
art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 4,
art. 146.
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applicable only during international armed conflicts.37 The Conventions also
expressly set forth the situations in which States must or may act vis-à-vis the
activities of other States. For instance, Article 12 of Geneva Convention III
imposes a duty to monitor the treatment accorded prisoners of war who
have been transferred to another State.38 Additionally, the instruments
specifically contemplate roles for certain States in fostering compliance by
belligerent States. Most significant among these is service by neutral States
as Protecting Powers on behalf of belligerent States.39 Finally, the negotiating
history of the Conventions contains examples of situations in which the role
of States that are not party to an armed conflict was discussed. Article 52 of
the Geneva Convention I, for instance, provides for an enquiry procedure
in case of violation by a belligerent State.40 During the Diplomatic
Conference that led to the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, the
delegates agreed that only belligerent States, and not any Party to the
Convention, could initiate such an enquiry.41
It also bears noting that the obligations set forth in the Geneva
Conventions tend to specify whether they apply in peace, during armed
conflict, or both. For example, States are obliged to engage in dissemination
and training during peacetime to ensure respect by their armed forces and
the civilian population.42 Yet, the sole “external” peacetime obligation is to
search for and prosecute or extradite those individuals who have committed
a grave breach of the Conventions.43 Therefore, a broad contextual reading
of the treaties augurs against an interpretation that would incorporate a
37. Of course, Additional Protocol I is inapplicable in non-international armed conflict
and therefore its “ensure respect” provision cannot be interpreted otherwise. See Additional
Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 1(3).
38. Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 12.
39. See Geneva Convention I, supra note 4, art. 10; Geneva Convention II, supra note 4,
art. 10; Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 10; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 4,
art. 11. See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 5.
40. The remaining Conventions also provide for enquiry procedures between
belligerent States. Geneva Convention II, supra note 4, art. 53; Geneva Convention III, supra
note 4, art. 132; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 4, art. 149.
41. 1952 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 24, at 375–77.
42. See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 4, art. 47; Geneva Convention II, supra
note 4, art. 48; Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 127; Geneva Convention IV, supra
note 4, art. 144; Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 83; Protocol Additional II, supra
note 5, art. 19.
43. Geneva Convention I, supra note 4, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 4, art.
50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 4, art.
146; Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 85(1).
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peacetime external obligation to ensure respect, especially when no specific
mention has been to that effect.
It is, therefore, counter-contextual to suggest that upon ratification of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, States understood they were impliedly
shouldering legal obligations regarding the activities of other States beyond
those already expressly set forth in the Conventions. Instead, they
understood that “ensure respect” was meant to impose purely internal
obligations and that, with limited exceptions like the obligation to prosecute
or extradite war criminals, those obligations applied only to States that were
parties to an international armed conflict. A more expansive obligation is
also illogical given the very significant burden the purported obligation
would have imposed, a burden far greater than that they assumed pursuant
to an ensure respect provision that was limited to an international armed
conflict to which they were party. Had States intended to accept an
obligation to ensure respect for the Conventions by parties to an armed
conflict to which they themselves were not a party, the obligation would have
been set forth in explicit terms.
III.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS

It remains to be determined, however, whether the meaning of the Common
Article 1 and Article 1(1) obligations to “ensure respect” has changed since
their adoption by States in the Geneva Conventions. According to Article
31(3) of the Vienna Convention on Treaties, in addition to context,
There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation….44

This requires consideration of those subsequent agreements and the practice
of States as to their understanding of the term.

44. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 31(3)(b).
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A. Subsequent Agreement
The two Additional Protocols of 1977 and that of 2005 were meant to
supplement the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which continued to apply fully.45
This being so, it is noteworthy that while Article 1(1) of Additional Protocols
I and III replicates the text of Common Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions, and therefore serves to reiterate the obligations contained in
the earlier articles with respect to international armed conflict, Additional
Protocol II, which applies only in non-international conflict, contains no
comparable provision. This distinction between Additional Protocols I and
II is especially relevant to the issue of whether Common Article 1 applies to
non-international armed conflicts, a matter discussed more fully below.
The inclusion of the “ensure respect” obligation in Article 1(1) of
Protocols I and III raises the question of whether the understanding of that
duty, at least on the part of States Parties to the two instruments, had evolved
to encompass an external obligation. It had not. In particular, and as
accurately noted by Professor Kalshoven, there is no indication that the
States that adopted Additional Protocol I at the final Diplomatic Conference
in 1977 intended it to encompass a new external obligation.46 Even advocates
of an external component to the “ensure respect” duty concede this point.
For instance, in a 2016 article, Professor Robin Geiss acknowledged that
“the drafting history of the Additional Protocols, in and of itself, is rather
inconclusive on the matter, and if viewed in combination with the travaux
préparatoires of the 1949 Conventions, would rather seem to militate against
acceptance of an external compliance dimension of the obligation to ensure
respect.”47
As with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the text of Article 1(1) must be
read in the context of the entire instruments. Additional Protocol I’s text
bears directly on the matter. Articles 7 and 89 set forth mechanisms for
ensuring respect by other States. Article 7 provides for meetings of the
Parties to the Protocol in the event of “general problems concerning the
45. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, pmbl.; Additional Protocol II, supra note 3,
pmbl.; Additional Protocol III, supra note 3, pmbl.
46. Kalshoven, supra note 6, at 45–54.
47. Geiss, supra note 10, at 121. As to Additional Protocol III, Verity Robson of the
United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, writing in her personal capacity, has
convincingly dispensed with any notion that the “ensure respect” text in that instrument
had that meaning. Robson, supra note 15, at 106–7.
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application” of the Conventions or the Protocol.48 Article 89 further
provides that “[i]n situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of
this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or
individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity with
the United Nations Charter.”49 It would be illogical to suggest that States
believed it necessary to specifically provide for cooperation with the United
Nations (which was already lawful pursuant to Chapters VI and VII of the
U.N. Charter50) in the face of violations by other States during international
armed conflicts to which the former were not party but saw no need to
affirm a far less settled obligation to act on their own accord in such
situations. This is especially so given that the text of Article 1(1) of
Additional Protocol I tracked that of Common Article 1, which did not
encompass such an obligation, with nearly surgical precision. Simple logic
compels the conclusion that Article 1(1) was not meant to alter or
supplement the Common Article 1(1) meaning of the term “ensure respect.”
Furthermore, Additional Protocol I provides for an optional
International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission in Article 90. The
Commission may investigate a situation alleged to involve a grave breach or
other serious violation of the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol I.
An investigation is mandatory if the States concerned are Parties to the
Protocol and have made a formal declaration accepting the Commission’s
competence. The parties to a conflict may also agree to refer the matter to
the Commission on an ad hoc basis. As with the corresponding articles of the
1949 Conventions, these provisions are compelling evidence that States
resolved to enumerate means for external enforcement for Additional
Protocol I rather than rely on Article 1 or any other provision to imply such
remedial measures.
B. Subsequent State Practice
When interpreting a treaty provision, consideration of State practice that
indicates agreement as to its interpretation is likewise appropriate.51 By the
same token, a lack of practice consistent with a claimed interpretation, or
contrary practice by one or more Parties to the treaty in question,
demonstrates the absence of agreement among the Parties as to the validity
48. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 7.
49. Id. art. 49.
50. U.N. Charter chs. VI–VII.
51. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 31(3)(b).
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of a new interpretation. Such practice can consist of a failure to take feasible
measures supposedly required by the purported norm, activities that would
run counter to it, and verbal practice in the form of statements that dispute
the existence of the claimed new interpretation.
For subsequent State practice to bear on a proposed interpretation of a
treaty obligation, it must be clear that the activities engaged in (or refrained
from) were the product of the State’s sense of legal obligation and not, for
instance, political concerns, national interests, or ethical commitments.
Absent this sense of opinio juris, the practice in question is not evidence of
the meaning of the provision in question.52
Subsequent State practice has not substantiated agreement among the
Parties to the respective instruments that the term “ensure respect” now
includes an external element.53 To begin, States that are not party to a conflict
regularly fail to take affirmative measures that are feasible in the
circumstances, or indeed any measures at all, to ensure that belligerent States
respect the relevant instruments. For example, it is almost always feasible for
States Parties to publicly condemn belligerent States that have breached the
Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol I during an international armed
conflict. Yet many, indeed most, States remain silent in the face of patent
violations.54 If States are under an obligation to take feasible measures to
ensure respect by other States involved in an armed conflict to which they
are not party, every such failure to condemn would be itself an internationally
wrongful act. In fact, given the frequency of armed conflict, most States
would be in violation of their purported ensure respect obligation most of
the time during an international armed conflict in which they were not
involved.
52. As has been noted in an unofficial commentary to the Vienna Convention,
The active practice should be consistent rather than haphazard and it should have occurred
with a certain frequency. However, the subsequent practice must establish the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation. Thus, it will have been acquiesced in by the other
parties; and no other party will have raised an objection.

MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 431 (2009).
53. For criticism of the State practice cited by the ICRC in its updated commentaries,
see Robson, supra note 15, at 107–8.
54. To take one example, consider the relative silence by States during the armed
conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008 in the face of repeated law of war violations.
See 2 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN
GEORGIA, REPORT 430–31 (2009), http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_
Volume_II1.pdf.
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States do not see themselves or other States as acting unlawfully when
they fail to speak out or take other feasible measures to ensure respect. Even
when States do condemn violations, they frequently forgo other measures
that might prove effective to draw a belligerent State into compliance with
its obligations under the law of war, including those appearing in treaties
with ensure respect provisions. For instance, a State may condemn breaches
by a belligerent State but continue to trade with that State. As an example, in
2015, the United States accused Russia of engaging in serious violations
during its international armed conflict with Ukraine.55 Yet, that same year,
Russian imports to the United States totaled over $16 billion.56
Similarly, consider the case of Saudi Arabia and arms trade. Saudi-led
operations in support of the government of Yemen began in 2015. Since
then, its operations repeatedly have been condemned as violating many law
of war rules.57 Yet, in July 2019, President Trump vetoed a bipartisan attempt
by Congress to ban the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia,58 while the United
Kingdom decided to renew the issuance of arms export licenses for the sale
or transfer of arms to the country following litigation in the Court of
Appeals.59 Indeed, Saudi Arabia is today the biggest arms importer in the
world,60 with such countries as Canada, France, Spain, Serbia, Georgia, South

55. See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2015:
UKRAINE (2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/253123.pdf.
56. Trade in Goods with Russia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c4621.html#2015 (last visited Dec. 18, 2020).
57. See generally Reports of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts (on Yemen),
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/43, pt. 1 (Aug. 17, 2018), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/42/17 (Aug. 9, 2019),
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/45/6 (Sept. 28, 2020).
58. Merrit Kennedy, Trump Vetoes Bills Intended to Block Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, NPR
(July 25, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/25/745200244/trump-vetoes-billsintended-to-block-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia.
59. Elizabeth Truss, Secretary of State for International Trade, United Kingdom,
Statement to Parliament: Trade Update (July 7, 2020), https://questionsstatements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2020-07-07/HCWS339.
60. USA and France Dramatically Increase Major Arms Exports; Saudi Arabia is Largest Arms
Importer, Says SIPRI, SIPRI (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.sipri.org/media/pressrelease/2020/usa-and-france-dramatically-increase-major-arms-exports-saudi-arabia-larg
est-arms-importer-says#:~:text=Saudi%20Arabia%20was%20the%20world's,arms%20
imports%20in%202015%E2%80%9319.
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Africa, and Turkey supplying major weapons.61 While the Saudi case is not
directly on point because the conflict in Yemen is non-international in
character, it is indicative of the attitude of many States toward pressuring
States to desist in law of war violations. This is not to say that they
countenance such violations, but rather to observe that other national
interests may militate against enforcement measures in particular cases.
Not only does State practice fail to establish an external component to
the Conventions’ “ensure respect” obligation, but some State legal advisers
assert that their States do not shoulder such an obligation as a matter of law.
Writing a half-century after adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, for
instance, Professor Kalshoven noted:
[S]everal legal advisers, when asked whether they regarded common Article
1 as imposing an obligation upon their governments to ensure respect of
the Conventions by other states, all answered in the negative. They did
however believe that their governments, as parties to the Geneva
Conventions, were definitely entitled to appeal to parties to armed conflicts
to respect the applicable humanitarian law.62

His discussions of the matter with the then senior lawyer of the ICRC (and
lead author of the ICRC’s commentary to the Additional Protocols), as well
as the organization’s president, also suggested that for other States, “ensure
respect” was primarily hortatory in nature and the obligation essentially
moral, as distinct from legal.63
In a more unambiguous expression of opinio juris, then U.S. State
Department Legal Advisor, Brian Egan spoke directly to the issue at the
April 2016 meeting of the American Society of International Law. He
asserted:
Some have argued that the obligation in Common Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions to “ensure respect” for the Conventions legally requires us to
undertake such steps and more vis-à-vis not only our partners, but all States
and non-State actors engaged in armed conflict. Although we do not share
this expansive interpretation of Common Article 1, as a matter of policy,
61. Angela Dewan, These Are the Countries Still Selling Arms to Saudi Arabia, CNN (Nov.
23, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/22/middleeast/arms-exports-saudi-arabiaintl/index.html.
62. Kalshoven, supra note 6, at 59–60.
63. Id. at 60.
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we always seek to promote adherence to the law of armed conflict generally
and encourage other States to do the same. As a matter of international
law, we would look to the law of State responsibility and our partners’
compliance with the law of armed conflict in assessing the lawfulness of
our assistance to, and joint operations with, those military partners.64

With respect to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Egan’s statement negates
the existence of agreement among the States Parties regarding any new
external component to the Common Article 1 ensure respect obligation.
Australia,65 Canada,66 and the United Kingdom are among other States
publicly taking, or unofficially indicating, a similar position.67
IV.

REIMAGININGS OF COMMON ARTICLE 1

As noted, international tribunals, international organizations, and the ICRC
have sought to reframe the ensure respect obligation to include an external
component. Their arguments are tenuous, for they ignore extensive negative
State practice and expressions of opinio juris that preclude reinterpretation of
the concept of ensure respect as a matter of treaty law.

64. Brian Egan, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Keynote Address at the
American Society for International Law: International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the
Counter-ISIL Campaign, (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Egan-ASIL-speech.pdf; audio available at https://www.asil.
org/resources/audio/2016-annual-meeting.
65. John Reid, Ensuring Respect: The Role of State Practice in Interpreting the Geneva Conventions,
ILA REPORTER (Nov. 2016), http://ilareporter.org.au/2016/11/ensuring-respect-the-roleof-state-practice-in-interpreting-the-geneva-conventions-john-reid/. At the time, Reid was
Head of the Office of International Law in the Attorney-General’s Department.
66. Turp v. Minister of Foreign Affairs, [2017] F.C. 84 (Can.) (Affidavit of Michael N
Schmitt in support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs position).
67. Writing in her personal capacity, although, tellingly, an attorney at the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, Robson noted
There is no general duty to prevent or bring to an end breaches by other parties to conflict.
Responsibility for compliance lies with the parties themselves, and other States may choose,
as a matter of policy, to take such steps as are appropriate in each conflict to encourage
universal respect.

Robson, supra note 15, at 115.
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A. The International Court of Justice
Proponents of the expansive approach to Common Article 1 argue that the
International Court of Justice endorsed external application of the “ensure
respect” obligation in its Paramilitary Activities judgment.68 The case examined
U.S. support of the Contras, an insurgent group involved in a noninternational armed conflict with Nicaragua's government.69 Although the
Court took notice of the Common Article 1 “ensure respect” obligation, at
issue in the case was US “encouragement” of law of war violations by the
Contras, who were funded, trained, and equipped by the United States. Of
particular note was dissemination by the Central Intelligence Agency of a
psychological warfare manual that contained advice on how to engage in
activities, including the assassination of certain civilians, that were manifestly
unlawful.70
States undoubtedly are obliged by international law to refrain from
actively encouraging violations of either treaties to which they are Party or
“cardinal” rules of the law of war, such as the prohibition on attacking
civilians, that are, in the words of the International Court of Justice,
“intransgressible.”71 However, that obligation stems from general principles
of international law, such as the obligation to carry out treaty obligations in
good faith,72 not from Common Article 1. For instance, by encouraging
violations by the Contras, the United States breached its obligation to respect
the Conventions and other rules of the law of war.73 Moreover, in the facts
of the Paramilitary Activities case, the obligation not to encourage violations
also derived from the customary international law prohibitions of
intervention into the internal affairs of other States and of the use of force
(both of which the Court concluded the United States violated).74 The point
is that the Court addressed the issue of encouragement of non-State actors;
it never dealt with the issue of whether States have a legal obligation to take

68. Paramilitary Activities, supra note 8.
69. On the prohibition of such intervention, see id. ¶ 219.
70. Id. ¶ 122.
71. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, ¶¶ 78–79 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
72. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 26. See also Villiger, supra note 49, at 366–67.
73. Paramilitary Activities, supra note 8, ¶ 220.
74. Id. ¶ 228.
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affirmative measures to ensure respect by other States that are party to an
armed conflict.
A second International Court of Justice case typically cited in discussions
of the term “ensure respect” is the Wall advisory opinion. In a fractured
opinion, the Court suggested other States were obliged to act to influence
Israel to respect its obligations in “occupied Palestinian territory” pursuant
to Article 1 of Geneva Convention IV.75 Although the facts of Wall are more
directly on point than those of the Paramilitary Activities case, the opinion has
proved highly controversial in light of the very politicized nature of the
subject matter.
The Wall case is of particular relevance in that it opines that the
obligations found in Common Article 1 are erga omnes,76 and therefore all
States had an obligation “to ensure compliance by Israel with international
humanitarian law as embodied in [Geneva Convention IV].”77 This is a
misapplication of the notion. Erga omnes obligations are allegedly owed to all
States without the requirement of reciprocity. Accordingly, while all States
are entitled to invoke the “responsible” State’s responsibility for having
engaged in an internationally wrongful act,78 purported erga omnes status of a
rule does not impose any obligation of enforcement on other States, the
breach of which would itself be internationally wrongful.
Further detracting from the significance of the Court’s work is the fact
that neither the Paramilitary Activities judgment nor the Wall advisory opinion
provided any substantive analysis of the ensure respect obligation. Surely the
Court would have been aware of the well established and agreed original
meaning of Common Article 1. To depart from that meaning should have

75. Wall, supra note 9, ¶ 158.
76. Erga omnes obligations are “[O]bligations of a State towards the international
community as a whole. . . . By their very [they] are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection . . . .” Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Second Phase),
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5).
77. Wall, supra note 9, ¶¶ 157–58. On the erga omnes characterization of Common Article
1, see also Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 519 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000). The ICRC shares this view. ICRC, 2021 UPDATED
COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III, supra note 12, ¶ 210.
78. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 17, art. 48(1)(b). See also Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Gam. v.
Myan.), Order, 2020 I.C.J. ¶ 41 (Jan. 23).

695

International Law Studies

2020

required the Court to survey State practice extensively for evidence of
agreement to expand the meaning of Article 1.
Yet, the Court’s judgment and advisory opinion include no such effort
or evidence. Rather, its assertions are highly conclusory. As noted by Judge
Kooijmans in his separate opinion in the Wall case:
The Court does not say on what ground it concludes that [Article 1]
imposes obligations on third States not party to a conflict. The travaux
préparatoires do not support that conclusion.
...
Since the Court does not give any argument in its reasoning, I do not feel
able to support its finding. Moreover, I fail to see what kind of positive
action, resulting from this obligation, may be expected from individual
States, apart from diplomatic démarches.79

Additionally, it must be stressed that advisory opinions are non-binding,
while judgments in contested cases like the Paramilitary Activities case bind
only the States before the Court.80 In light of the shallow analysis,
disagreement among the judges, and the nonbinding nature of the findings
on States other than those before the Court, the judgment and opinion
represent unreliable evidence of an external element to the ensure respect
obligation.
B. International Organizations
Proponents of the expansive interpretation of Common Article 1 point to
other sources that also fail to establish the requisite foundation for
interpretive deviation from the original meaning of Common Article 1.81 For
instance, United Nations General Assembly resolutions, which are
nonbinding and may reflect political and other considerations on the part of
States that support them, are sometimes cited. However, States have
formally and correctly objected to reliance on such instruments as examples

79. Wall, supra note 9, at 230–31, ¶¶ 47, 50 (separate opinion by Kooijmans, J.). Judge
Kooijmans spoke approvingly of, and cited from, the Kalshoven analysis. Additionally,
Judge Higgens noted that the “Final Record of the diplomatic conference . . . offers no
useful explanation of that provision.” See id. at 217, ¶ 39 (separate opinion by Higgens, J.).
80. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 59.
81. Dörmann & Serralvo, supra note 15, at 717.
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of State practice or opinio juris.82 And to the extent that such resolutions do
not reflect State practice or are opposed by some States, they, as explained
above, cannot serve authoritatively as evidence that States Parties to the
Conventions have reinterpreted the ensure respect obligation.
Similarly, advocates of the expansive interpretation cite United Nations
Security Council resolutions in support of their view.83 Although such
resolutions may sometimes qualify as State verbal practice for those States
sitting on the Council that vote for them, they do not constitute evidence of
the position of other States because those States are expressing no view at
all. Nor do they even necessarily reflect dispositive evidence of the legal
position of the States voting for them. As with General Assembly
resolutions, they are often the product of political, policy, and other
motivations, rather than definitive expressions of a State’s views regarding
the existence of a particular legal norm or its appropriate interpretation. For
instance, the United States voted for a Security Council resolution that
“call[ed] upon the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention
of 1949 to ensure respect by Israel, the occupying Power, for its obligations
under the Convention in accordance with article 1 thereof.”84 However, as
clearly illustrated by State Department Legal Adviser Egan’s statement
above, the United States rejects any obligation to ensure respect vis-à-vis
States that are party to a conflict to which the United States is not party.
C. Private Publications
Unsurprisingly, private proponents of an expansive interpretation of
Common Article 1 often accord undue weight to purported evidence in their
work. A number of examples illustrate this tendency.
In both its 2005 Customary International Humanitarian Law study and the
three updated commentaries, the ICRC highlighted the 1968 Teheran
International Conference on Human Rights as a significant example of

82. Letter from John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State &
William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense to Jakob Kellenberger,
President, International Committee of the Red Cross (Nov. 3, 2006), reprinted as A US
Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study on Customary International
Humanitarian Law, 89 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 443 (2007).
83. Dörmann & Serralvo, supra note 15, at 717–18
84. S.C. Res. 681, ¶ 5 (Dec. 20, 1990).
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subsequent practice.85 The Conference adopted Resolution XXIII, which
stated that Parties to the Geneva Conventions sometimes failed “to
appreciate their responsibility to take steps to ensure the respect of these
humanitarian rules in all circumstances by other States, even if they are not
themselves directly involved in an armed conflict.”86 Yet, as Professor
Kalshoven pointed out, the participants “accepted without debate a text that
was so weak as to be almost meaningless.”87 Indeed, as Knut Dörmann, the
senior legal advisor to the ICRC, noted in 2014, “it is not absolutely clear
whether the term ‘responsibility’ referred to a legal obligation or something
less.”88
Similarly, the Customary International Humanitarian Law study pointed to a
NATO Parliamentary Assembly resolution as evidence of such an obligation,
as did the aforementioned ICRC legal advisor in an academic article.89 In
fact, all the NATO resolution does is remind States of their “obligation,
under the Geneva Conventions, not only to ‘respect’ but also to ‘ensure
respect’ of the Conventions in all circumstances.”90 It is true that States
shoulder an obligation to ensure respect for the Conventions in all
circumstances. The question, however, concerns the substantive content of
the obligation. There is no indication in the NATO resolution that the
Assembly was referring to any binding obligation that non-Parties to the
Kosovo conflict take action to ensure respect of IHL by parties to that
conflict.
As noted above, treaty interpretation admits subsequent agreements that
bear on the meaning of the provision in question. However, private
proponents of the expansive view of Common Article 1 sometimes apply
this rule of treaty interpretation inappropriately. For example, citing the
85. ICRC, 2016 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 12,
¶ 156; ICRC, 2017 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 12,
¶ 178; ICRC, 2020 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III, supra note 12,
¶ 189; 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 510 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts
& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY].
86. FINAL ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 18, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.32/41, U.N. Sales No. E.68. XIV. 2 (1968).
87. Kalshoven, supra note 6, at 43.
88. Dörmann & Serralvo, supra note 15, at 707, 717.
89. CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY, supra note 85, at 510; Dörmann & Serralvo, supra note 15,
at 717.
90. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Parliamentary Assembly, Civilian Affairs
Committee Resolution No. 287, ¶ 7 (Nov. 15, 1999).
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aforementioned Tehran Resolution XXIII and a U.N. General Assembly
resolution,91 the 2016 ICRC Commentary on Geneva Convention I notes:
It was in full knowledge of these developments that the [ensure respect]
clause was reaffirmed in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol I, and later in
Article 38(1) of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article
1(1) of the 2005 Additional Protocol III. The 2013 Arms Trade Treaty,
which subjects arms transfer decisions to respect for humanitarian law by
the recipient, refers explicitly to the obligations to respect and to ensure
respect.92

However, as explained, Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol I cannot be
read as suggested. And with regard to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, a careful reading of that instrument yields the opposite conclusion.
Article 38(1) provides “States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure
respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in
armed conflicts which are relevant to the child.”93 The text “applicable to
them in armed conflicts” demonstrates that “ensure respect” in the case of
this instrument refers to obligations borne by States that are parties to an
armed conflict. Moreover, Article 2(1) provides that “States Parties shall
respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each
child within their jurisdiction.”94 The “within their jurisdiction” clause
denotes an obligation of States that exercise control over the territory or
persons in question, not an obligation with respect to the activities of other
States.
As to Additional Protocol III, which establishes a new distinctive
emblem in addition to the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Article 1(1) simply
replicates the ensure respect language found in the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I.95 Despite the fact that the question of ensuring respect
for the Conventions and Protocols by other States had surfaced by 2005,
neither the preamble to the instrument nor its articles goes beyond the
requirement to ensure respect found in the earlier instruments. Moreover,
the subject is left undeveloped in the ICRC Commentary to Protocol III
91. G.A. Res. 2851 (XXVI) (Dec. 20, 1971).
92. ICRC, 2016 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 12,
¶ 156.
93. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 38(1), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
94. Id. art. 2(1).
95. Additional Protocol III, supra note 3, art. 1(1)
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produced two years later.96 Had States wished to expand the scope of the
notion of ensure respect, Additional Protocol III would have represented an
excellent opportunity to do so; but apparently, they did not.
Beyond such overstatements, advocates of an external component in
Common Article 1 seldom cite actual examples of States having taken
affirmative measures to ensure respect for the Conventions by other States.
Nor do they even proffer significant examples of situations in which one
State criticizes another for its failure to comply with a purported legal duty
to take measures to ensure a third State complies with the Conventions
obligations during armed conflict. Finally, and perhaps most critically, they
offer no account of rampant “negative practice,” that is, those instances in
which States fail to take measures to ensure respect by other States.
In light of the thin support for a legally binding external element in the
ensure respect obligation, as well as significant State practice to the contrary,
it is clear that the expansive view cannot be supported as a matter of the
extant law. State practice shows that the obligation to “ensure respect” in the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols I and III does not apply to a
State that is not a party to an armed conflict.
V.

CONFLICT NOT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER

Those who support an expansive interpretation of ensure respect also
suggest that the obligation applies in non-international armed conflict.97 Of
course, Additional Protocol I is limited to international armed conflicts,
including conflicts against “colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of . . . self-determination . . . .”98 Thus,
only the question of the applicability of Common Article 1 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions to non-international armed conflicts is at issue.
In interpreting Common Article 1, it is essential to bear in mind the
historical circumstances in which States negotiated and adopted the 1949
Geneva Conventions. Until adoption of the Conventions, international law
96. Jean-François Que´guiner, Commentary on the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem
(Protocol III), 89 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 175 (2007).
97. See, e.g., ICRC, 2016 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra
note 12, ¶ 125; ICRC, 2017 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra
note 12, ¶ 147; ICRC, 2020 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III, supra
note 12, ¶ 158.
98. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 1(4).
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was generally silent with respect to internal conflicts. Such conflicts were
deemed to be the concern, consistent with the principle of sovereignty, of
the State in which they took place. However, in light of such conflicts as the
Spanish Civil War and Greek Civil War, States participating in the diplomatic
conference leading to adoption of the Geneva Conventions agreed that some
degree of regulation, albeit far less than that which was to apply in
international armed conflicts, was necessary. That step was cautiously taken,
with only a single substantive article devoted to such conflicts in each of the
four Conventions—Common Article 3.
The Pictet commentaries confirm that Common Article 1 was not meant
to apply to the non-international armed conflict situations addressed by
Common Article 3. For example, the Commentary to Geneva Convention I,
published just three years after adoption of the Conventions, provides “[i]f
the Convention was to include provisions applicable to all non-international
conflicts, it was necessary, as we have seen, to give up any idea of insisting
on the application to such conflicts of the Convention in its entirety.”
Legally, therefore, the parties to the conflict are only bound to observe
Article 3 and may ignore all the other Articles. It is obvious, however, that
each one of them is completely free—and should be encouraged—to declare
its intention of applying all or part of the remaining provisions.99
Proponents of an external component to Common Article 1 typically
point to the “in all circumstances” phrase in the article to support extension
to non-international armed conflicts. However, as explained above, they
misunderstand the purpose of that phrase. Indeed, the 1929 Conventions, in
which the phrase initially appeared, dealt only with what is today labeled
international armed conflict. That the 1949 Conventions’ “in all
circumstances” text was not intended to extend the reach of the Common
Article 1 obligations to non-international armed conflicts is equally apparent.
For example, the 1952 Geneva Convention I Commentary succinctly provides,
“the words ‘in all circumstances’ do not relate to civil war.”100 Eight years
later, the Commentary to Geneva Convention IV again confirmed that
Common Article 1 is inapplicable to non-international armed conflicts: “The
words ‘in all circumstances’ which appear in this Article, do not, of course,
cover the case of civil war, as the rules to be followed in such conflicts are
laid down by the Convention itself, in Article 3.”101
99. 1952 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 24, at 59.
100. Id. at 27.
101. 1958 COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 24, at 16.
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Perhaps most compelling in support of the position that the Common
Article 1 obligation to ensure respect does not apply in non-international
armed conflicts is the fact that although Additional Protocol I on
international armed conflict includes such an obligation, Additional Protocol
II, which is the first treaty to exclusively address non-international armed
conflict, does not. Had the States participating in the 1973-1977 Diplomatic
Conference that produced two Additional Protocols meant the ensure
respect obligation set forth in Common Article 1 to apply in noninternational armed conflicts, they would have taken the opportunity to
reiterate the point in Additional Protocol II, as they did for international
armed conflict in Additional Protocol I. This omission of the obligation in
Additional Protocol II, therefore, operates as a subsequent agreement
demonstrating that there was no intention to encompass non-international
conflict in the Common Article 1 obligations of the Geneva Conventions
themselves.
VI.

CUSTOMARY OBLIGATION TO ENSURE RESPECT

It is clear that Common Article 1 neither contains an external element that
obligates States that are not party to an international armed conflict to take
measures to ensure respect by belligerent States nor applies the ensure
respect obligation as it is properly understood in non-international armed
conflict. However, the related question of whether such obligations exist as
a matter of customary law merits brief attention.
There is widespread consensus that the Conventions now reflect
customary international law.102 This was acknowledged by the International
Court of Justice in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, where the Court
observed, “these fundamental rules are to be observed by all States whether
or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they
constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.”103 The
U.N. Secretary-General reached the same conclusion in the report
introducing the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the

102. See, e.g., discussion in Frederic Megret, The Universality of the Geneva Conventions, in
THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 668; Theodor
Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 348 (1987).
103. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 71, ¶ 79.
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Former Yugoslavia,104 which was subsequently approved by the Security
Council.105 That there is a customary international law obligation to ensure
respect mirroring that contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions would
appear uncontroversial.
However, as the International Court of Justice observed in its Paramilitary
Activities judgment, a customary norm that is reflected in a treaty, even if
identical in meaning at the time, enjoys a separate existence.106 That being so,
the content of the customary variant may evolve over time. Yet, for the same
factual reason that attribution of an external element to Common Article 1
fails, a similar evolution in meaning cannot have occurred with regard to the
customary obligation to ensure respect—there is insufficient State practice
or expressions of opinio juris to support such an interpretation.107 Indeed,
negative practice and contrary opinio juris serve as dispositive confirmation
that an external component of the ensure respect purported norm has not
crystallized into customary international law.
And it must be recalled in this regard that the State practice concerned,
“including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have
been both extensive and virtually uniform.”108 State practice evidencing an
external element is neither. Moreover, the United States’ opposition to the
notion is particularly important. Given the frequency and intensity with
which it engages in armed conflict, as well as its unparalleled ability to
influence the actions of other States that find themselves on the battlefield,
it surely qualifies as “specially affected” in this regard.
104. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
105. S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
106. Paramilitary Activities, supra note 8, ¶¶ 176–79.
107. The universally accepted requirements of State practice and opinio juris derive from
Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which includes as sources
of international law “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law.” Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(b)(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
33 U.N.T.S. 99; see also S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at
18 (Sept. 7); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969
I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶¶ 71, 77 (Feb. 20); Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J.
13, ¶ 27 (1985).
108. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 107, ¶ 74. See also International Law
Commission, Report on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, ¶ 7 (2018);
G.A. Res. 73/203, ¶¶ 1, 7 (Jan. 11, 2019) (Having considered the International Law
Commission’s report and taken note of its recommendations, the U.N. General Assembly
welcomed the conclusions and acknowledged the utility of wide dissemination of the
recommendations.).
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Aside from the issue of the existence of an external element, the question
also remains as to whether a customary law obligation to ensure respect,
whatever its parameters, has crystallized for application in non-international
armed conflict. That States are obliged as a matter of customary law to
respect those rules that apply during a non-international armed conflict is
self-evident. A State, and therefore both its organs and non-State actors
whose actions are attributable to the State pursuant to the law of State
responsibility, must abide by the customary law of war irrespective of
whether any treaty provision requires it to do so.
The absence of an obligation to respect and ensure respect in Additional
Protocol II is instructive on this issue. In that States bear a general
international legal duty to honor their legal obligations (whether contained
in law of war or other international law regimes), it was not imperative to
codify the obligation to respect in Additional Protocol II. However,
international law generally does not require States to ensure the respect of
international law rules by entities or individuals whose conduct is not
attributable to a State as a matter of law. That being so, it seems States would
have codified, as they often do in treaties, any distinct customary law
obligation to “ensure respect” during a non-international armed conflict in
Additional Protocol II so as to emphasize its existence, exactly as they did
for the ensure respect obligation during international armed conflicts in
Additional Protocol I. Moreover, no State practice supports the proposition
that the legal obligation to ensure respect applies in non-international armed
conflicts.
Any assertion that an ensure respect obligation exists in customary law
during a non-international armed conflict also runs counter to the general
reticence of States to accept obligations with respect to non-international
armed conflicts. Such conflicts have been regarded by States as primarily
matters of internal concern. It, therefore, would be counterintuitive to
presume that States are of the legal view (the opinio juris required for the
crystallization of a customary rule) that they are required under customary
law to ensure respect in such conflicts. Indeed, the hesitancy of States to
accept limitations on their activities during a non-international armed
conflict is well illustrated by the fact that only Common Article 3 expressly
applies to non-international armed conflicts in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, and that while Additional Protocol I on international armed
conflict has 102 articles, Additional Protocol II contains only twenty-eight
for non-international armed conflicts.
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Even if an ensure respect obligation applied during non-international
armed conflict, the obligation would not include an external element. After
all, there is even less justification for a conclusion that under customary law
non-parties to a non-international armed conflict must take measures to
ensure respect by the parties to the conflict than is the case of international
armed conflict. The internal nature of the former tends to pose
comparatively less risk to international security and stability than the latter
and is, therefore, generally of lesser international concern. Moreover, and as
just noted, States jealously guard their internal prerogatives. For these
reasons, if a customary international law obligation to ensure respect existed
for non-international armed conflict, its scope would not exceed that
applicable in international armed conflicts and therefore would include no
duty on the part of States that are not party to a non-international armed
conflict to ensure respect by those States that are party to the conflict.
VII.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The 1949 Geneva Conventions’ unique place in the law of war presents both
opportunity and obligation. Their status as unrivaled common ground
between States during armed conflict makes the Conventions an attractive
vehicle for reform. Reform-minded efforts have seized upon them,
particularly Common Article 1, as an opportunity to give greater
humanitarian force to their already formidable regulation of hostilities. While
reformers’ motives are perhaps laudable, they have, to date, offered
insufficient evidence to support their claim that the Common Article 1
“ensure respect” obligation includes an external component.
First, their accounts do not accord with or account for the original
meaning of the article. The negotiating history of Common Article 1 makes
it clear that States understood the Article would only impose internal
compliance obligations on States for the conduct of their own armed forces
and groups under their control during international armed conflicts to which
they are a party. Second, expansive accounts of Common Article 1 misjudge
the practice of States subsequent to adoption of Common Article 1.
Assessment of the seventy years of practice reveals neither explicit
subsequent agreement by States to modify their Common Article 1
obligation nor sufficient subsequent State practice to establish agreement to
that effect. In fact, negative State practice concerning external obligations
establishes the Article’s original meaning as its currently established meaning.
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If the Conventions offer unparalleled humanitarian opportunity, they
surely demand comparable obligations of reverence and care in their
interpretation. To sustain the Conventions’ reach and reputation as legal
common ground requires meticulous attention to the bargains struck and
consented to by States. Reform through immoderate interpretation rather
than formal amendment or other established processes threatens not only to
distort the meaning of carefully considered and formulated legal doctrine. It
threatens to divide the community of States and erode the Conventions’
status as vital legal common ground between States during armed conflict.
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